This article examines the domestic political sources of immigration control in advanced market economy countries after World War II. Immigration control can be distinguished from the broader concept of immigration policy by its emphasis on state policies that define the permissible level of resident alien admissions. The analysis is based on the well-established fact that immigrant communities are geographically concentrated. I argue that this geographic concentration creates an uneven distribution of costs and benefits, providing a spatial context for immigration politics. In this context, net public demand for tighter immigration control increases in localities where immigrants concentrate when those areas experience higher unemployment, rapid increases in immigration, higher immigrant proportions, and more generous immigrant access to social services. Each of these conditions aggravates competition between immigrants and natives, and hence native hostility, in these communities while employer support for immigration usually diminishes. Yet national politicians may ignore changes in the demand for immigration control unless these constituencies are also able to swing a national election from one party to another. The larger and less “safe” the local constituencies, the greater their influence in this sense. Evidence from the United Kingdom between 1955 and 1981 is consistent with these propositions.

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1. Although immigration control includes temporary visitors who enter the country for a short time, such as tourists and business visitors, I focus only on those who enter on a nontemporary basis. I also exclude from the analysis policies controlling refugees and asylum seekers.

In advanced market economy countries in the late 1990s, the importance of understanding the politics of immigration control may seem self-evident. Immigration is a Janus-faced policy with both domestic and international consequences. Domestically, many politicians are confronting a politically powerful backlash against foreign residents of all types: undocumented and documented, foreign born and foreign by ethnicity, workers and dependents, voluntary migrants and involuntary refugees and asylum seekers. At the same time, employers continue to petition for greater access to migrant labor, both skilled and unskilled. Internationally, conflict arises over disparate national interests, such as the desire by developing countries for greater emigration versus the preference for limited immigration by advanced industrial countries. Alternatively, conflict arises when one country implements policies that transfer its control problems to other nations. The 1993 German policy to reject asylum seekers transiting “safe” countries en route to Germany reduced Germany’s intake of asylum seekers but only at the expense of an increase of immigrants in neighboring countries.

Empirically, national patterns of immigration control vary widely, despite similar positions of advanced industrial countries in the global economy. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, for example, many OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries experienced low unemployment and tight labor markets, leading to rising wages. Yet some countries chose to import immigrant labor to moderate wages and labor-market shortages (for example, France, Germany, and Australia), whereas others discouraged immigration altogether (for example, Japan) or began closing the door to labor-market immigrants well before the oil shock of 1973 (for example, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Sweden). In light of similar labor market conditions, the variation in immigration control represents an interesting empirical puzzle.

Moreover, the international flow of people has not yet been systematically drawn into the research agenda in international political economy. Although the determinants of global patterns of trade, production, and capital flows are now widely studied, immigration remains predominantly in the domain of economists, demographers, and sociologists. The literature on immigration policy formation that does exist tends to be country specific rather than comparative, making it difficult to sort between idiosyncratic factors and more generally applicable theories. As James F. Hollifield notes, “truly comparative works on immigration are few. In the field of migration studies, the tendency has been to collect national case studies, bind them together, and call the study comparative. Such compendia are useful sources of information, but they rarely yield theoretical insights.” Comparative research on the sources of immigration policy and patterns will inform the research agenda of international political economy by including an important flow of resources across national boundaries.

The article is divided into four parts. In the first section I briefly describe the distinctive patterns of immigration in selected OECD countries and the standard explanations advanced to account for these patterns. I explain in the second section

how the geographic concentration of immigrant communities affects the domestic distribution of costs and benefits associated with immigration control policies. This geographic concentration provides the spatial context for the politics of immigration control. I then examine the local conditions that create support for and opposition to immigration by focusing on the business community and the general population. To explain the changing attitudes of the native population toward the immigrant community, I adopt a theory of native–immigrant competition over scarce resources. Business support varies with the tightness and flexibility of labor markets as well as with the potential for capital mobility, among other factors. I then connect the underlying structural conditions to the local and national political agendas through the dynamics of party competition. In the third section, I illustrate the model with an analysis of British immigration policy. In the fourth section I compare the analysis with the British literature on immigration control to evaluate the power of the general framework against country-specific explanations. Finally, I return to the cross-national variation in immigration control and suggest areas for further theoretical and empirical research.

Although standard explanations of immigration policy favor domestic political factors, my approach is distinctive in three ways. It focuses on the local community as the primary unit of political analysis; it provides a theory to explain changing local preferences for and against immigration; and it systematically incorporates institutional aspects of the political system through which societal demands are funneled.

### Immigration Patterns and Prevailing Explanations

#### Trends in Immigration

Industrial democracies vary greatly in the degree to which they discourage immigration. Because countries employ different labels for different types of individuals who cross national borders, it is impossible to provide a concise picture of cross-national variation in resident alien intake (defined as the level of aliens permitted to enter the host country and take up residence for at least twelve months). Nonetheless, a variety of indicators suggests that tolerance for resident aliens varies substantially among advanced industrial countries. One such indicator is the average annual gross flow of legal resident aliens per capita. As depicted in Table 1, the intake range is broad. At the low end, Japan permitted entrance to only 3 aliens per ten thousand national population per year on average between 1962 and 1991. Australia and New Zealand are at the high end of the spectrum, allowing the entrance of 81 and 136 resident aliens, respectively, per ten thousand national population. Belgium and Canada are

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5. Immigration policy is generally understood to be composed of two components—immigration control and immigrant integration. My research question specifically addresses the former rather than the latter and, as such, may not be generalizable to this second aspect of immigration policy.

6. A second indicator is the “stock” of resident aliens as a proportion of total population; see SOPEMI 1993 for current and historical data.
closest to the unweighted annual average of the data set, with 58 per ten thousand per year.

Some surprising facts emerge from these data. For example, the United States is widely perceived as a country of immigrants with a tradition of openness to immigration. Yet, although the United States admitted large absolute numbers of immigrants, on a per capita basis it is located toward the low end of the scale, with 24 aliens per year per ten thousand on average for the period under review. Another anomaly is Germany. Even though it proclaims that it is not a country of immigration, (West) Germany admitted relatively large flows of aliens on a per capita basis, even when excluding the ethnic Germans who migrated from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as these figures do.

**Explanation of Trends**

Many explanations have been advanced to account for variation in immigration control policies among advanced industrial countries. Most point to aspects of national identity, to economic factors, or to the interaction between economic and cultural dimensions of immigration.

One group of analysts focuses on conceptions of ethnicity, citizenship, and/or national identity to predict immigration policy.7 Doris Meissner, for example, juxtaposes European nations in which citizenship is tied to “shared ethnicity and national-

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7. See, for example, Foot 1965 on Britain; Higham 1963 on the United States; and Meissner 1992 for a comparative analysis.
concerning attitu

dy’ to attitudes in the “traditional settler nations,” such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, “where nation building through immigration led to ideas of membership based on civic participation and a generally shared commitment to democratic values.” From this perspective, “settler” states are those where national identity and citizenship are based on civic values of participation; immigrants are viewed as potential citizens, and the state is relatively open to immigration. In contrast, “nonimmigrant” nations are those where citizenship and national identity are based on ethnicity; where these cultural values hold, immigrants are viewed as aliens or foreigners, and low levels of immigration are anticipated. Because national identity is fixed, in order to account for the variation over time the analyses introduce additional exogenous variables. From the “identity” perspective, elites, institutional structures, or extremist groups, for example, can damp down or kindle pressures to control alien entry.

Economic interests of domestic political actors are a second major explanatory scheme. One group of analysts favors employer interests in explaining levels of openness. According to Marxian analyses, employer interests are dominant because of their privileged access to the capitalist state; for public choice analysts, it is because employers face fewer collective action problems than do employees or the public at large; for labor market analysts, employer interests are a reasonable proxy for other societal interests because migrant labor is concentrated in the secondary labor market and therefore complements and enhances the returns to the native labor force deployed in the primary labor market. Alternatively, domestic political actors are believed to have competing economic interests, forcing them to vie in the political arena for different policy outcomes. That is, “different social classes within the national territory will have conflicting interests which can result in opposing positions on immigration.” In other words, employers are one important class of political actors in favor of immigration, but now unions (or other interest groups) enter the political equation as actors who “might be opposed on the ground that this will harm workers’ wages and working conditions.” From the “economic” perspective, variation is explained either in terms of employer demand for labor and hence for migrants or in terms of power balances among societal actors, some who support immigration, others who oppose it.

Finally, many analysts point to the tension between economic benefits that accrue from immigration and the cultural costs that openness entails. One method of modeling the relationship between economic and cultural variables and political outcomes focuses on the competition for scarce resources.

9. Alternatively, “this view assumes that ethnic and racial strife is inevitable and invariant” and cannot account for variation over time; see Olzak 1992.
10. See, for example, Roeder 1994.
15. For alternative ways of modeling the relationship between the economic and cultural variables, see Hollifield 1992; Freeman 1995; Zolberg 1983; and Leitner 1995.
as a contested social boundary that becomes politically significant only when competition for scarce resources arises between the native and the immigrant populations. Susan Olzak, for example, argues that “competition potentially occurs when two or more groups come to exploit the same realized niches.”

“Niche overlap” triggers ethnic competition and, with it, anti-immigrant sentiment. From the “competition” perspective, anti-immigrant sentiment and hence political opposition to immigration are not constant but change in light of changing circumstances: the size of the immigrant community, its rate of growth, and other socioeconomic factors.

Each of these alternative hypotheses has been criticized on both logical and empirical grounds. However, rather than discard the hypotheses, I suggest that because immigrants are geographically concentrated, the analysis must be disaggregated to the level of the salient local political units. Then, each of these perspectives may provide some insight into the dynamics of immigration policy. Those who emphasize national identity suggest that the analysis must also be sensitive to factors that mediate between public opinion and policy outputs, that is, the political institutions of the nation. Those who emphasize economic variables suggest that important political actors are not limited to those concerned with national identity. Societies have political actors who actively promote immigration as well as those who oppose it. Those who focus on the interaction of cultural and economic variables suggest that the intensity and hence the political significance of national–ethnic identity may vary, and that explanations should incorporate variables that affect the intensity of public opinion. In this sense, the three types of analyses are incomplete but complement each other. The explanation I offer builds on these insights while emphasizing a fourth element, the geographic concentration of the immigrant community.

The Political Geography of Immigration Control

The Geographic Concentration of Migrants

Among demographers and sociologists, the geographic specificity of migratory patterns is well known, on both the sending and receiving end. “Migrants arriving in a particular country do not spread out randomly throughout all possible destinations.” Examples abound. In the United States, six states of fifty—California, Texas, Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois—host 73 percent of the immigrant population; 33 percent of the foreign-born population reside in California alone. In 1990, 8 percent of the U.S. population were foreign born, but they comprised 22 percent of California’s population and 16 percent of New York’s. This pattern holds in Australia as well. There, in 1991, 22 percent of the population were foreign born; this population is concentrated in the cities and suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne. Of the 147

17. In conformity with academic fashion, all of the authors cited provide a critique of the alternative theoretical frameworks while making the case for their own.
18. White 1993b, 52.
parliamentary constituencies with approximately equal population, the smallest percentage of foreign born was 4.8 percent, and the largest was ten times that level, 49 percent. Thirty of the 147 constituencies had foreign-born populations of at least 30 percent; all but seven of these are located in the Melbourne and Sydney metropolitan areas. A similar concentration of immigrants is found in European states. In Britain, for example, 58 percent of the Afro-Caribbeans live in Greater London as do 80 percent of the black African immigrants. In France, 40 percent of the foreign-born population can be found in the Parisian basin, with the remainder of the immigrants concentrated in the industrial regions surrounding Lyon, Marseilles, and Strasbourg.

This spatial concentration of migrants is attributed to several factors. Paul White enumerates the economic, social, political, and geographic forces that affect migrant destinations in the host countries, the most important of which are the initial economic pull of labor markets and the subsequent reinforcement of migrant concentration through migrant networks or “chain migration.”

This brief overview indicates that the spatial concentration of immigrants in host countries is well documented empirically and well understood theoretically. The political significance of this concentration, however, has been widely overlooked. One factor that may diminish the significance of the immigrant community’s geographic concentration—and may account for why this aspect of immigration has been ignored in political analyses of immigration policy—is internal migration. Internal migration tends to distribute the economic costs and benefits more evenly among the indigenous population. Furthermore, the social impact of immigration is reduced by the self-selected out-migration of individuals with the least tolerance for immigrants. There are two reasons, however, to believe that internal migration does not mitigate entirely the consequences of immigrants’ geographic concentration. First, internal migration is never so complete that it entirely separates the indigenous and immigrant communities. Therefore, for better or worse, interaction between the two populations is always higher in some areas than in others. Second, what appears to be a recent trend in internal out-migration may, in fact, intensify relations between the two communities by increasing the ratio of immigrants to the remaining indigenous population.

The argument is straightforward. Because immigrant communities are spatially concentrated, the impact of the immigrant community is not evenly spread across the indigenous population. For better or worse, interaction between the host and immigrant populations is higher where they are concentrated. Internal migration may diminish the impact of spatial concentration but does not erase it. So we need to examine the spatial distribution of both the benefits and costs of immigration in order to understand the politics of immigration control. It is this interaction that I attempt to model in the next section, followed by an analysis of how local preferences in sup-

19. See Martin and Midgley 1994 for the United States; Kopras 1993 for Australia; Cross 1993, 124, for Britain; and King 1993 for France.
21. See Borjas 1994; and Frey 1994 for the United States; for Britain, see Cross 1993; and for Europe more broadly, see White 1993b.
port of and in opposition to immigration are filtered through specific national political institutions to affect political outcomes.

I begin with a model of immigration policy as a function of domestic political interests. I assume, following the “regulation school” of politics, that politicians maximize the likelihood of (re)election by promising and producing policies that maximize political support while minimizing political opposition. Immigration control can be modeled as a function of the support for and opposition to immigrant flows, arising from distinct societal sources. However, I focus on the local support for and opposition to immigration, the politicization of immigration in local politics, and its translation onto the national political agenda. I draw on the literature on immigration control but apply it at the local level.

Support for Immigration

On the demand side, firms are the primary actors with an interest in immigrant labor and an incentive to lobby government regarding immigration issues. I argue that local support for immigration varies over time in response to employers’ labor market needs. Local support is strongest in periods of low unemployment; however, support will be mitigated by flexible labor markets and high capital mobility.

Other factors being equal, low levels of local unemployment put pressure on local wage levels. Local labor market conditions, however, may be insufficiently attractive to generate internal migration, giving rise to geographically segmented labor markets and geographically specific corporate demands for immigrant labor. Regardless of conditions in the economy as a whole, local labor market conditions may intensify the demand for immigrant labor.

Other factors are not always equal however. Firms with high capital mobility, such as manufacturing firms with standardized technology, can choose to export capital to sites of cheap foreign labor, whereas other firms have no alternative but to petition for the importation of labor. Natural resource–based firms, agricultural producers, and service firms (in-person delivery of services) are spatially fixed and therefore unable to reduce labor costs through capital exports. Firms in declining sectors of the economy also lack capital mobility. Given equal levels of unemployment, support for immigration will be strongest among firms with limited capital mobility. Therefore, local demand for immigrant labor will be strongest where firms with limited capital mobility dominate the local economy.

Firms also confront variation in labor market flexibility. Numerous studies demonstrate that migrant labor provides desired flexibility by participating in the secondary labor market. That is, immigrants permit the expansion of dual labor markets and increase flexibility of production. Firms confronting inflexible labor markets will prefer higher levels of immigration than firms confronting flexible labor markets. Given equal levels of unemployment and similar levels of capital mobility, local

demand for immigrant labor will be strongest where employers experience inflexible labor markets.

**Opposition to Immigration**

I argue that local conditions trigger anti-immigrant sentiment through the level of native–immigrant competition. Although this thesis is not original, I clarify the conditions under which competition increases and diminishes, thereby isolating those factors that intensify opposition to immigration. This competition contains at least three dimensions. The first dimension, labor market competition, is triggered by economic recession. The second dimension, competition over state resources, is triggered by economic recession and the rate of growth of the immigrant community, as well as the level of immigrant access to publicly provided goods. The third dimension, competition over societal identity, is triggered by the size of the immigrant community but is offset by assimilation of the immigrant community into the native population. The argument is conjunctural; that is, opposition to immigration that becomes *politically* important is triggered by the presence of an immigrant community in conjunction with economic recession. It is aggravated by the degree to which the migrant community challenges the preeminence of the native community.

*Competition over market-based resources.* A considerable amount of controversy exists regarding the position of the migrant vis-à-vis the native workforce. Some economists argue that migrants complement the native workforce and actually enhance the returns of the native population by increasing their productivity and, hence, their wages. Others argue that the immigrant labor force substitutes for the native workforce; in this view, immigrants obtain employment at the expense of the native population. For example, where indigenous labor is skilled and immigrant labor unskilled, immigrants may be employed to increase the productivity of the native workforce, thereby increasing the wages of those workers. In contrast, unskilled immigrant workers may compete with and displace native unskilled workers, thereby reducing the wages of those workers. Because the labor market is never completely segmented, undoubtedly there is some truth to both propositions. I focus on the variation in labor market segmentation during periods of recession and economic prosperity that modifies the level of competition between the native and immigrant workforce.

Economic recession places the native and immigrant labor forces in more direct competition than in periods of economic prosperity. The dynamic proceeds because workers are often willing to take otherwise unacceptable employment during periods of economic downturn. To be sure, this willingness is mitigated by the presence of a “reservation wage,” the remuneration available from nonwork sources, such as unemployment benefits and family allowances. To the extent that employment exists at greater than the reservation wage, unemployed workers accept employment that is

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24. See Borjas 1994 for an overview of the debate as well as extensive citations of the literature.
lower in pay and prestige during economic recession. This is because they evaluate the probability of future employment opportunities differently in periods of economic recession than in periods of economic prosperity. An individual will accept employment when the offer exceeds the value of the probability of employment at the previous (higher) wage and exceeds the reservation wage. In economic recession, the probability of employment at the higher wage diminishes, thereby making less-remunerative employment more acceptable than in periods of economic prosperity. If these jobs are filled with immigrant labor, as undoubtedly some are, the competition between the native and immigrant labor force will rise during economic downturns.\textsuperscript{25} In sum, competition for market-based resources—jobs—intensifies during periods of economic recession, leading to the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment; in periods of economic prosperity, competition diminishes, leading to the decline of anti-immigrant sentiment.

\textit{Competition for state-based resources.} Another vociferous debate centers around whether immigrants contribute more in taxes than they receive in services from the state.\textsuperscript{26} Again, I attempt to avoid this debate by pointing out that competition varies as a function of economic prosperity, regardless of the underlying net balance of contributions. Economic recession reduces state revenues while increasing demands on those revenues. The scarcity of resources available to the state for redistribution increases the competition between the immigrant population and the native population over access to these assets regardless of whether immigrant contributions exceed expenditures on immigrants. Moreover, the broader the immigrant access to resources, the broader the base of competition and hence the more intense the competition. At yet a more general level, economic recession reduces the reservation wage and aggravates the competition between the native and the immigrant workforce over employment by enlarging the segment of employment opportunities over which they compete.

The competition over state-based resources also increases as a function of the rate at which the immigrant population increases. The state provides public as well as private goods to its residents.\textsuperscript{27} Public goods in the rigorous sense are characterized by two traits: nonexcludability, which means that once the good is provided to a particular class of individuals, other members of that class cannot be excluded from consuming that good; and jointness of supply, which means that the provision of the good to one person does not diminish the supply available to others. To the extent that public goods are nonexcludable but lack jointness of supply, these goods become subject to crowding, thereby increasing the competition between the indigenous and

\textsuperscript{25} The immigrant also faces a reservation wage but one that is generally lower than the native worker’s. The gap between the immigrant and native reservation wages depends in part on the degree to which benefits offered to the native population are extended to the immigrant population.

\textsuperscript{26} This debate is summarized in Martin and Midgley 1994; see also Simon 1989 and the citations listed therein. As George J. Borjas points out for the United States, the dependency ratio is based on the composition of the immigrant intake, among other factors, and that composition changes over time; see Borjas 1990.

\textsuperscript{27} See Zolberg 1992; and Freeman 1986.
immigrant communities for these goods. If the rate of increase in the immigrant community is large, immigrants stretch the capacity of the system to deliver these goods: classrooms become crowded, traffic increases, public transportation becomes overburdened, sewage treatment facilities are overloaded. In the medium to long term, additional public goods may be made available, as revenues from the increased population flow to the state and are allocated to the provision of these goods. In the short term, however, competition for these goods is exacerbated by a rapid increase in the number of immigrants.

*Competition for “community” resources.* As foreigners enter a community, they bring with them an alternative conception of society, thereby presenting competition over the definition of the local community.\(^{28}\) Rather than being associated with economic recession, this competition is triggered by the sheer number of immigrants in the community. The competition is offset by the process of assimilating the foreign population into the native population, thereby undermining competition from the alternative. The ability of immigrants to assimilate and the length of time required to do so appear to vary across groups; this introduces immigrant characteristics into the equation of native–immigrant competition.\(^{29}\)

*Local Patterns of Support and Opposition and the Local Political Agenda*

At the local level, party positions reflect the underlying preferences of the population for immigration control. As structural conditions that affect support for and opposition to immigration change, the position of the local parties will change as well.

Models of collective action suggest that large groups are more difficult to organize than small groups and are therefore less powerful politically.\(^{30}\) If this is true, then employers should always be more politically powerful than “public opinion,” and immigration control policy should be similarly skewed toward employers’ interests. The geographic concentration of immigrants, however, tends to concentrate the costs of immigration and facilitates the organization of political opposition to immigration at particular conjunctures.\(^{31}\) To draw on James Q. Wilson’s policy typology, I argue that under certain conditions the politics of immigration policy shift from “client” to “interest group” politics.\(^{32}\) The former policy type is characterized by the political

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\(^{28}\) Waever 1993.

\(^{29}\) This can be, but is not necessarily, associated with race. In Britain, for example, most observers would argue that European migrants are more easily assimilated than the “coloured” migrants from the “New Commonwealth” countries. Yet Switzerland has failed to integrate its European (Italian) immigrant population, and, in France, black Africans were initially better received than Spaniards, although North African Arabs are the least well integrated. See Castles and Kosack 1973, chap. 10, for a discussion of race and discrimination against the immigrant community. Additional examples come from Germany and Japan. Both countries have ethnically homogenous immigrants who, having re-immigrated after generations of absence, face considerable discrimination despite a common ethnicity.

\(^{30}\) Olson 1965.

\(^{31}\) The argument is similar to Gary P. Freeman’s but not identical; see Freeman 1995.

\(^{32}\) Wilson 1980.
participation of groups receiving concentrated benefits and the absence of organized opposition from those bearing the diffuse costs of immigration, whereas the latter is characterized by political activity from pro-immigrant groups receiving concentrated benefits and anti-immigrant groups bearing concentrated costs.

Empirically, societal opposition to immigration sometimes resembles the interest group organization of employers; examples include FAIR (Federation of Americans for Immigration Reform) in the United States and the Birmingham Immigration Control Association in Britain. It is sometimes represented by political parties, such as the Vlaamsblok in Belgium or the National Front in France, or it may be more amorphous, such as the initiative movements in California and Switzerland. As the costs of immigration increase, however, the political salience of the opposition to immigrants increases. This picture is consonant with public opinion surveys in advanced industrial countries that indicate most respondents oppose additional immigration but also believe that immigration is not a significant political problem most of the time. Thus opposition to immigration periodically becomes organized rather than remaining constantly latent. Political organization can be attributed in part to the concentration of costs arising from immigration associated with the concentration of the immigrant community—a facet that is largely overlooked by those who analyze the politics of immigration control policy.

Thus both support for and opposition to immigration are politically organized and politically significant. However, support and opposition do not necessarily rise and fall in tandem. That is, when opposition to immigration is at a peak, support can be either strong or weak. Support for and opposition to immigration are connected through unemployment: when unemployment is high, other things being equal, local support will be weak and opposition will be strong. However, opposition may rise during a period of economic prosperity in the presence of a large, unassimilated population; and support may be strong in periods of economic recession, if firms face inflexible labor markets and/or capital immobility.

Driven by electoral competition, local politicians will shift their policy positions in response to changing community preferences, toward either greater openness or greater closure. This depiction of immigration control suggests two hypotheses. First, policy positions of mainstream parties will tend to converge toward the local median voter. Second, as preferences of the population on immigration control shift, the positions of the parties will tend to shift in tandem. I do not suggest that positions of candidates will always be identical and shift to exactly the same degree; rather, candidates learn that their positions differ from constituency preferences through electoral defeat. They respond by changing their positions or are replaced by candidates who will. Furthermore, the positions of the parties reflect not the extreme position of some supporters but a balance between the support for and opposition to immigration. However, because immigration control is determined in the national rather than

33. Christopher Husbands makes a similar distinction between “racism” and “political racism,” the subset of racism that affects political outcomes; see Husbands 1988.
in the local political arena, it is crucial to understand the conditions under which local demands are successfully transmitted to the national level.

**Playing the Immigrant Card—The National Political Agenda**

If local politicians respond to the changing distribution of support for and opposition to immigrants in their communities, national politicians respond to different incentives; that is, they respond to the shifts in preferences of those constituencies that are important for building a national electoral majority. The preferences will be accorded greater weight if the constituents have the potential to swing the national election results between parties. Thus local preferences are not translated on a one-to-one basis to the national political agenda. Both the size and the safety of the constituencies factor into the political calculus of national leaders when evaluating the level of electoral competition. Immigration control will tend to be added to the national political agenda in those cases where constituencies can swing the electoral outcomes. This will be true for policies broadening opportunities for immigration as well as policies limiting immigration.

The influence of local constituencies on national electoral outcomes depends in part on the size of the constituency seeking to add immigration issues to the national political agenda. In the United States, for example, states vary in the electoral support they can offer the presidential coalition in accordance with the number of their electoral college votes. Large states, such as California, are politically important because a victory there may swing the national presidential election to the victorious party. When immigration policy is important in California politics, it is more likely to be addressed at the national level than if similar concerns were voiced in Wyoming. In Britain, on the other hand, each constituency carries equal weight in the House of Commons; there, the number of constituencies interested in immigration control policies must be compared to the winning party’s electoral margin.

The influence of local constituencies also depends on the “safety” of the constituencies. Regardless of the constituency preferences, if the constituency cannot convincingly threaten defection to the opposing party, their policy preferences are less important to the national coalitions. Definitions of safe constituencies vary across countries depending on the electoral system as well as the attributes of the voters. In Australia, for example, constituencies are considered safe when the electoral margin between the parties is more than 10 percent, “fairly safe” when the margin falls between 7 and 10 percent, and swing when the margin is less than 7 percent. In the United States, the cutoff is usually 20 percent. Whatever the definition of safety, however, it is widely known, and national politicians attempting to gain or maintain national power pay more attention to swing constituencies than to safe constituencies.

National political institutions are crucial to understanding the transformation of immigration from a local to a national political issue; institutional characteristics

define the significance of local support for and opposition to immigration in building national political coalitions. Presidential systems will reflect a different dynamic than parliamentary systems; proportional representation systems will reflect a different dynamic than single-member constituency systems. The common thread running through all nations is the need for politicians to build a national electoral majority. Immigration control will be added to the national political agenda where those constituencies are both willing and able to swing the electoral outcome between parties.

The theoretical framework I have sketched can be reduced to a series of statements about the relationship between structural and institutional variables and political outcomes. Immigration control is a function of the direction and political salience of societal preferences. In turn, the salience of preferences is a function of the national electoral margin and the size and safety of “immigration” constituencies. The direction of preferences is a function of local unemployment rates, local rates of capital mobility, local labor market flexibility, local rates of immigration increase, the proportion of immigrants in the local community, their access to social services, and the degree to which immigrants have been assimilated into the local community.

**British Immigration Control**

Britain is an interesting case because restrictions on Commonwealth immigration were originally introduced in 1961 and instituted in 1962 in an era of full employment and when economists both within and outside the government were predicting severe labor shortages. Furthermore, the controls were introduced when the proportion of the foreign-born population was small, only around 1 percent, and in contrast to the British tradition of integrating immigrants through a policy of *jus soli*, the granting of citizenship by birth on British soil. This pattern of restriction contrasts sharply with other European countries that, at the same time, were in the process of rapidly expanding their immigrant workforce.

The British case is also interesting because the perceived bipartisan consensus for restrictive immigration control appeared to break down in the 1970s, when the Labour party failed to introduce additional restrictions during their control of Parliament between 1974 and 1979, despite the rise in electoral popularity of the National Front—a failure the Conservative party capitalized on in their 1979 electoral victory. I argue that these anomalies can be explained through the political leverage of a small number of electoral constituencies. In the first case, the Labour and Conservative parties competed for votes from constituencies that experienced economic decline in the presence of a substantial immigrant community and therefore opposed continued immigration. In the second, Labour’s parliamentary pact with the Liberal party, undertaken to retain a working majority in Parliament, forced Labour to consider its ally’s pro-immigrant constituencies. The Conservatives, on gaining the parliamentary majority in 1979, were not so restrained and introduced additional controls, thereby deflating the electoral appeal of the anti-immigrant National Front.
I begin with an overview of immigration control policies in Britain in the post–World War II period. I then analyze the 1961–64 shift from openness to relative closure, the 1974–79 maintenance of the status quo, and the 1979–81 movement toward further restrictions.

**British Immigration Control**

The immigration status quo in the United Kingdom after World War II involved two sets of foreign-born populations: aliens and Commonwealth citizens. The first law restricting alien entry was passed in 1905, designating particular ports of entry and authorizing immigration officers to refuse entry to and to deport “undesirable” aliens—those unable to support themselves and their dependents. The Alien Restriction Act of 1914 strengthened and enlarged the provisions of the 1905 act. The 1914 act was revised and extended in 1919 and renewed annually until 1971, when the system of immigration control was revised.

The second group, imperial subjects and Commonwealth citizens, was governed by custom that permitted free circulation within the empire, including the mother country, Britain. Until 1945, free circulation had worked in favor of British emigration. The close of World War II brought a period of transition from empire to Commonwealth and with it a clarification of the rules governing access to the mother country. The 1948 British Nationality Act distinguished between citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies (CUKC) and Commonwealth citizens, but Commonwealth citizens, as British subjects, maintained the right to enter British territory freely and retained access to all citizen rights and privileges, including voting. Registration for British (CUKC) citizenship required only twelve-months residence.

**Conservative Introduction of Immigration Control and Labour’s Subsequent Conversion, 1961–64**

During World War II, Britain imported colonial labor to supplement its war effort. Although most of these immigrants were repatriated after the war, the poor economic conditions in their home countries prompted them to return to Britain. Jamaican citizens, who were familiar with Britain as a result of their wartime work, began to arrive in 1948. Indians and Pakistanis followed suit. They settled in London, in the industrial midlands, and in the Northwest. The usual immigrant networks started to operate, facilitating the passage of both family and friends. Commonwealth immigration control was never entirely absent from the political agenda and public eye during

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36. Since gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1921, Irish citizens have always been treated as a special category whose entry is uncontrolled. Difficulty of controlling the border between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland is one purported reason.
the postwar period. However, the British government, under both Labour and Conservative control, regularly reviewed the issue and deemed controls inappropriate.\textsuperscript{38}

As a result, and in contrast to the prewar period that favored British emigration, New Commonwealth (NCW) immigration increased rapidly.\textsuperscript{39} NCW immigrants formed the largest part of the increase in immigration and in the foreign-born population in Britain. Between 1951 and 1966, they accounted for 60 percent of the increase in the foreign-born population in Britain—almost six-hundred thousand in all.\textsuperscript{40} Perhaps more importantly, for the purposes of the argument, the pace of immigration picked up in 1960 and 1961. As the figures in Table 2 demonstrate, after declining from 1956 to 1959, both gross and net NCW immigration expanded on what appeared to be an exponential track in 1960 and 1961. In contrast, gross alien admissions during the same time frame were about one-quarter of gross NCW admissions and demonstrated no upward trend.

Moreover, the impact of NCW immigration was unevenly distributed among the British populace. In the United Kingdom as a whole, of the 630 parliamentary constituencies, the average number of NCW immigrants present in the population was 1.7 per one hundred, but the range was enormous.\textsuperscript{41} Many constituencies had no

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{New Commonwealth immigration to the United Kingdom, 1955 to 30 June 1962}
\begin{tabular}{llllllll}
\hline
Year & West Indies & India & Pakistan & Other NCW & Net flows & Gross flows & Gross alien flows \\
\hline
1955 & 27,550 & 5,800 & 1,850 & 7,500 & 42,700 & 76,150 \\
1956 & 29,800 & 5,600 & 2,050 & 9,400 & 46,850 & 84,780 \\
1957 & 23,020 & 6,620 & 5,170 & 7,590 & 42,400 & 80,750 \\
1958 & 15,020 & 6,200 & 4,690 & 3,990 & 29,900 & 67,890 \\
1959 & 16,390 & 2,930 & 860 & 1,420 & 21,600 & 64,110 \\
1960 & 39,670 & 5,920 & 2,500 & 9,610 & 57,700 & 116,500 & 32,218 \\
1962 & 31,400 & 19,050 & 25,090 & 19,350 & 94,890 & 124,450 & 31,382 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Source: For New Commonwealth figures, Davison 1966; for gross alien figures, Institute of Race Relations 1969, 17.

\textsuperscript{a}For NCW immigrants, figures are for the first six months of 1962 only, before the implementation of controls. For aliens, the figures encompass the entire year.

\textsuperscript{38} See Layton-Henry 1987; and Rose 1969.

\textsuperscript{39} The Commonwealth originally referred to the association of self-governing communities of the British Empire, composed of the “old” Commonwealth countries, the (white) settler states of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa. As other parts of the empire became independent in the years following World War II, they joined the Commonwealth, hence the designation “new” Commonwealth nations.

\textsuperscript{40} Jones and Smith 1970, chap. 2.

\textsuperscript{41} These statistics are drawn from the 1966 10 percent sample census—the first census in which the data were presented by parliamentary constituencies. Given the reduction in immigration subsequent to the 1962 introduction of immigration control, these numbers provide a reasonable representation of both the volume and the distribution of the immigrant population in 1961.
NCW immigrants at all, and more than half of the constituencies had fewer than one NCW immigrant per one hundred residents. On the other hand, fifty-one constituencies had NCW populations ranging from 5 to 15 percent.42 This concentration was aggravated by the fact that NCW immigrants tended to settle in those areas that attracted other immigrants as well. The proportion of NCW immigrants in the population is correlated at the .73 level with Irish immigrants and at the .51 level with aliens. Gordon Walker, in leading the opposition to the Conservative bill, acknowledged the “clotting” of the immigrant population, with 40 percent located in London and an additional 30 percent in the West Midlands.43 Of the 630 electoral constituencies, 106 had a combined alien and NCW immigrant population of more than 5 percent; at least 33 of these had a combined alien and NCW immigrant population of more than 10 percent. If the Irish are included, 120 constituencies had foreign-born populations of more than 7 percent.

Thus the British polity was faced with a rapidly rising immigrant population concentrated in London and the West Midlands (Birmingham). The question is how this affected the support for and opposition to immigration. Given the tight labor markets—where vacancies continued to exceed unemployment—support for immigration did not decline. The government predicted labor shortages of two hundred thousand annually as late as 1965.44 Moreover, employers in sectors with low capital mobility remained the primary recruiters of immigrant labor. Declining industries, especially the northern textile companies, relied on immigrant labor to maintain their competitive advantage. The British government itself was actively involved in recruiting immigrant labor for the London Transport and the National Health Service. The British Hotels and Restaurants Association also actively enlisted Commonwealth immigrants.45

Opposition to NCW immigration during the 1950s appears to have been mild.46 By most accounts, the immigrants were “replacement” workers; that is, they gained employment in industries deserted by the native labor force due to low wages and poor working conditions. They took up jobs in stagnant manufacturing industries, such as textiles and foundries, and in the service sector, in transport, and in the National Health Service, that is, in exactly those industries characterized by low capital mobility. The newly arrived immigrants found housing in inner-city areas—housing that was vacated by the native workforce as they moved to more desirable suburban locations.

However, recession in regions of rapidly expanding immigrant communities triggered growing opposition. The economic downturn in 1958 produced race riots in Nottingham (Birmingham) and London’s Notting Hill district. The 1959 election

42. This total corresponds closely with the fifty constituencies designated as “colour problem districts,” selected on the basis of the electoral importance of the immigration issue. For details, see Patterson 1969, 417–22.
44. Dummett and Nicol 1990, 23.
46. Patterson 1969. See also Layton-Henry 1987, where he notes that, in the early 1950s, “ordinary people in Britain seemed by no means intolerant of coloured people in their midst.”
year economic boom, however, undercut these tensions, and immigration was not actively debated during the campaign. It was the 1961 recession that triggered broader-based opposition. The recession intensified competition between the native and the immigrant populations, in both social services and employment. The impact of the recession itself was uneven and reinforced the negative effects of industrial restructuring in areas where immigrants were concentrated. Despite overall job creation, London and Birmingham (West Midlands) were the only two cities to show a postwar decline in manufacturing employment as manufacturers either went out of business or moved to the surrounding counties. The pressure was especially intense in Birmingham because, in contrast to London, the Birmingham economy was relatively undiversified. With production concentrated in consumer durables—automobiles—the region was especially sensitive to downturns in the economy and the 1961 “pay pause” that reduced product demand. Additionally, despite the overall tightness of the labor markets, many of those displaced had the least resources, either financial or educational, to move to areas of economic growth. This may explain why opposition to immigration was more vociferous in the West Midlands than in London.

Unemployment rates are available only by metropolitan area rather than by constituency. Data indicate that in April of 1961 unemployment rates in London were more than double the national average, with a 3.2 percent London average for native-born males and 2.5 percent for native-born females, against a 1.3 percent unemployment rate in the nation as a whole. Foreign-born unemployment rates in London ranged from 4.4 to 7.4 percent for foreign-born males and 2.5 to 7.6 percent for foreign-born females. By comparison to today’s unemployment rates, these may seem minuscule, but they were large by the standards of the day.

Labor market competition was aggravated by competition over state resources such as national assistance and Council housing. As Conservative Member of Parliament R. H. Turton (Thirsk and Malton) noted, “[even] where there is the problem of full employment . . . the position will arise in which there will be more people wanting jobs in a particular town than can be accommodated and looked after.” Because the immigrant community invariably had higher levels of unemployment than the native workforce throughout the 1960s, constituents complained bitterly about “the number of coloured immigrants receiving national assistance.” Tension also arose over housing. Immigrant access to Council housing was normally limited by a five-year residence requirement. Slum removal, however, required rehousing of slum occupants in Council housing. Immigrants who settled in the city centers and occupied slums therefore leapfrogged over natives on the waiting list for Council housing.

47. This view is widely held. See Butler and Rose 1960; and Steel 1969.
49. See Robinson 1984; and Studlar 1977.
50. Davison 1966, chap. 5.
Schools, too, became crowded with children, many of whom spoke a foreign language. An Institute of Race Relations study from the 1960s reported the same type of concentration in schools as in the population at large.\textsuperscript{54} Nine percent of public primary and secondary schools had immigrant pupils exceeding 10 percent of the student population, and half of those (4.4 percent) had an immigrant student population exceeding 20 percent.

Moreover, the competition with NCW immigrants was more fierce than for the alien population. As Commonwealth citizens, these immigrants were eligible for all state services extended to the native population. In addition, NCW citizens brought many more dependents with them than did aliens, in part because rights of family reunification were not extended to aliens. Between 1960 and 1962, alien dependents were 7 percent of the gross flow. No comparable figures exist for NCW immigrants prior to control, but in the first full year of control when vouchers were still relatively plentiful, dependents made up 48 percent of the gross flow.\textsuperscript{55} Thus NCW immigrants availed themselves of a broader variety of state-supplied services.

Cultural competition is less amenable to quantitative measures. Nonetheless, studies of immigrants, and NCW immigrants in particular, indicated substantially different cultural mores, ranging from race, religion, and language to food, clothing, music, and marital patterns.\textsuperscript{56}

The change in structural conditions—high and rising immigration in concentrated areas, combined with local unemployment, immigrant access to social services, and the crowding of public facilities—was reflected in growing opposition to immigration in the affected communities. Politicians became aware of this opposition and its political significance through various channels. Politicians in Britain, as elsewhere, focus more attention on marginal constituencies, that is, those constituencies that might defect to the opposition if their preferences are ignored. Yet it was often difficult to assess these constituency preferences through public opinion polls because polls were either unavailable or failed to address significant issues until after they had already become politically significant. Moreover, national-level polls may fail to clearly delineate local concerns.\textsuperscript{57} As a result, strategic politicians rely on a variety of indicators. One manifestation of constituency concerns was the organization of the local communities into political organizations, such as the Birmingham Immigration Control Association, established in 1960. Another method of determining constituency preferences is communication with constituency representatives to the party, including Members of Parliament (MPs) from marginal constituencies. On immigration issues, Conservative MPs complained of the concentration of immigrants in

\textsuperscript{54} Institute of Race Relations 1969. “Immigrant pupil” was defined as a child born outside the British Isles or a child born in the United Kingdom of foreign-born parents who immigrated within the last ten years. Children of “mixed” immigrant–indigenous parents and Irish children are excluded.

\textsuperscript{55} Institute of Race Relations 1969.

\textsuperscript{56} See Patterson 1963; and Pilkington 1988.

\textsuperscript{57} This may be true because the local concerns are not national concerns and are thus overlooked. Even when local concerns are included in national polls, the polls are structured to evaluate national opinion, and, therefore, without changes in sample selection the statements about national opinion cannot be transferred to the local level.
their constituencies, the rate of increase in immigration, immigration housing in areas of housing shortages, the rate of employment, and educational problems.\textsuperscript{58}

That these indicators were a reasonable gauge of anti-immigrant sentiment in constituencies is reflected in a retrospective analysis of public opinion. Public opinion polls in 1964 showed a substantial correlation (.41) between the structural conditions defining anti-immigrant constituencies and the opinion that immigrants were a “problem” in the respondent’s neighborhood.\textsuperscript{59} Thus changes in structural conditions were a reasonable indicator in the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment and were employed by the politicians themselves in gauging the political salience of immigration control.

Thus Conservative party recognition of their vulnerability to anti-immigrant constituencies came when, in preparation for their annual party conference, 39 of the 576 motions submitted for discussion at the party conference proposed immigration control.\textsuperscript{60} Cyril Osborne, a Conservative backbencher who had been lobbying for immigration control since 1952, was no longer alone. A number of Conservative MPs returned in 1959 were from swing districts in which immigration was large. Examples include Leslie Cleaver of Birmingham, Sparkbrook, with a 10.3 percent foreign-born population and an electoral margin of 2.6 percent; John Hollingworth of Birmingham, All Saints, also had a large immigrant population in his constituency and won by a margin of less than 1 percent. The motion in support of immigration control legislation was seconded at the party conference by Barbara Madden, the Conservative candidate from Southall, with a foreign-born population of 12.3 percent and an electoral margin of 5.4 percent. She was supported by Toby Jessel from Peckam, 6.2 percent foreign-born, who won the seat with a margin of 4.2 percent; and Frank Taylor, Manchester Moss Side, with a 12.8 percent foreign-born population, although this was considered a safe Conservative seat. These individuals, both within and outside Parliament, had an impact on the Conservative leadership because they represented or sought to represent constituencies that had to cope with large immigrant populations and because they represented marginal constituencies.

The Conservative party had achieved a comfortable margin of fifty seats in the 1959 Parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{61} Of the 106 constituencies with at least 5 percent combined NCW and alien population, however, two-thirds were held by Conservative MPs—an indicator that, despite accounts to the contrary, initially immigrants were concentrated in Conservative rather than Labour constituencies. Thus the leaders of the parliamentary Conservative party, despite a comfortable electoral margin,

\textsuperscript{58} Conservative Party 1961.

\textsuperscript{59} Public opinion data are from the Butler and Stokes 1964 polls and are combined with the 1966 census data to evaluate the effects of constituency characteristics on public opinion; see Butler and Stokes 1972. The 1964 polls are the most proximate polls to the period under review that include questions on the political salience of immigration and residence locators necessary to match constituency characteristics with individual respondents. The 1966 and 1970 polls show a similar relationship.

\textsuperscript{60} Foot 1965, 136. By comparison, motions on the European Economic Community membership, a hotly disputed issue, numbered forty. One lone pro-immigrant motion was submitted.

\textsuperscript{61} The margin is defined as the number of seats the parliamentary majority would have to lose to give the (combined) opposition a majority.
faced potential opposition within their party that threatened their parliamentary majority.  

Were there fifty seats to be lost to the opposition parties in a national election? In this initial period when the exact dimensions of public opposition were unclear, the margin is close enough so that, when confronting the issue, party leadership would be concerned. By my estimate, at least 36 of the 106 constituencies previously cited were swing constituencies, that is, constituencies that were highly contested by the Conservative and Labour parties. Patterson designates fifty constituencies as “colour problem districts”—districts selected on the basis of the electoral importance of the immigration issue. This is not to claim that fifty seats were lost on the immigration issue in the following general election. Nevertheless, the potential was there, and the Conservative Party did lose the 1964 election despite their comfortable national electoral margin.

Thus, as a member of the opposition noted in the 1962 parliamentary debate on immigration control, “it may be that there is some electoral advantage in the position that the government have adopted.” Conservative leaders were haunted by the cynical comment of Churchill that “perhaps the cry of ‘Keep Britain white’ might be a good slogan” for future elections fought without his leadership. Recognizing the strength of the anti-immigrant lobby and its potential for undermining the parliamentary majority, the queen’s speech delivered on 31 October 1961 included immigration control in the legislative agenda. The first reading of the bill was 1 November, and the government proceeded quickly thereafter, pushing for final passage by 17 February 1962. The Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 created controls over Commonwealth citizens for the first time.

The controls were effective. Net immigration in the six months prior to the implementation of the act was 86,700; for the six months after the act, it was less than one-tenth that level, 8,290. Part of this change is undoubtedly due to the rush to beat immigration controls. However, after controls were implemented in July 1962, quotas served to dramatically limit Commonwealth immigration. Between July 1962 and December 1964, the United Kingdom received 444,263 applications for work vouchers, but only 49,951 voucher holders were admitted.

Labour had vociferously opposed this control legislation but shifted its position as the party recognized the political consequences of its pro-immigration stance. The 1964 elections were critical in providing these political lessons. The adoption of an

62. This comfortable margin was reduced to a single vote on a different issue in March 1963, demonstrating the potential threat to the parliamentary majority; see Butler and King 1965, chap. 1.
63. Philip Norton defines swing as constituencies with less than 10 percentage points difference between the two largest parties; see Norton 1994. This definition has been adopted here, although it may be a conservative definition. See later discussion for a Labour defeat in a supposedly “safe” constituency in 1965.
64. Patterson 1969, 417–22.
anti-immigrant stance by Labour at the national level can be attributed to the close-
ness of the election—a four-seat margin—and the potential for future by-elections to
be fought on immigration issues. In this regard, the 1964 campaign fought in
Smethwick (Birmingham) is instructive. Smethwick had a NCW population of 6.6
percent and a total foreign-born population of 9.5 percent. As with other constitu-
cencies in the industrial midlands, the area was undergoing economic restructuring. The
1961 recession brought unemployment; by 1962, 10 percent of the immigrants were
unemployed.68
The 1964 campaign was waged by Conservative Peter Griffiths on the immigra-
tion issue. Gordon Walker, the Labour candidate who had won the previous four
elections, was the Labour shadow secretary who helped lead the opposition to the
Conservatives’ immigration control act. Not only did Walker lose the seat, but the
Smethwick constituency experienced the largest swing toward the Conservative party
of any constituency. The Labour party won the election with a swing toward Labour
in all but twenty-six constituencies. Of these constituencies that swung against the
tide for the Conservative party, none was larger than 3.5 percent except Smethwick,
which experienced a swing of 7.2 percent.69
With its margin of four seats, Labour vacated a “safe” seat in order to elect Walker,
so that he could join the cabinet. The constituency of Leyton was chosen in part
because the electoral margin there was 16.8 percent, registered only a few months
earlier. That election was lost as well, and with it the Labour margin was diminished
to two seats.70 The lesson was learned. Despite the fact that immigration had played a
nominal role in the overall election, it was important in a small number of constitu-
cencies. By-elections in these constituencies promised to threaten Labour’s parliamen-
tary majority. Given the fact that in 1961 two by-elections were fought on immigra-
tion issues (Small Heath–Birmingham and Moss Side–Manchester), this threat was
potent. It is not surprising then that the Labour party reduced the quota of work
vouchers from twenty thousand to eighty-five hundred and brought out a White
Paper endorsing immigration control.
Labour leaders acknowledged this electoral pressure in private. Richard Cross-
man, a Labour MP from the West Midlands, reported in his diary that “ever since the
Smethwick election it has been quite clear that immigration can be the greatest poten-
tial vote loser for the Labour party.” In his words, Labour had “out-trump[ed] the
Tories by doing what they would have done and so transforming their policy into a
bipartisan policy.”71 The Conservative party offered a similar interpretation, one that
emphasized the role of marginal constituencies. Their 1965 party conference proceed-
ings record that “when [Labour] realized that continued opposition to the [Common-
wealth Immigration] measure would probably lose them the Election they executed a
neat volte face and grudgingly supported a policy of control. Now, under pressure

68. Foot 1965.
69. Ibid.
70. Apparently, the second election was not fought on immigration issues; its importance is to the
narrowness of the parliamentary majority; see Dummett and Nicol 1990.
from their marginal seats, their recent White Paper includes a discriminatory system of arbitrary controls, in an effort to gain cheap electoral popularity.”

Labour went on to introduce additional restrictions in 1968, restrictions that allowed the government to renege on the promises made only a few years earlier to British passport holders in newly independent African nations. When the Conservatives returned to power in 1970, they revamped the immigration control system and brought NCW immigration in line with the more restrictive alien immigration control system.

Labour’s Failure to Enact Immigration Control, 1974–79

After a four-year hiatus, Labour returned to power in February 1974 with a minority government and, after obtaining a narrow parliamentary majority in October 1974, retained power for the next five years. Yet the party failed to introduce additional immigration control legislation. The inactivity of the Labour majority on immigration control issues between 1974 and 1979 appears puzzling on several accounts.

First, Labour promised in both its general election manifestos of 1974 to review the issues of immigration associated with British citizenship and to pass appropriate legislation. Moreover, in 1977 the Labour government published a Green Paper that developed a restrictive notion of citizenship—a definition adopted in subsequent Conservative legislation on British citizenship—yet failed to introduce the legislation during its five years as majority parliamentary party. Second, despite its narrow parliamentary majority that ultimately disintegrated into a minority government, Labour had indeed implemented most of its “fairly radical” legislative program, leaving only a few election campaign promises unresolved. Yet additional immigration controls promised in the election manifestos were among the few that were not implemented.

Third, this was a period in British history when anti-immigrant sentiment was widespread. One indicator was the rising prominence of the National Front, an anti-immigrant party, culminating in electoral success in the Greater London Council elections of 1977. This was also a period of economic recession and high unemployment generated in part by the oil shock of 1973. The Conservative party certainly perceived a potential electoral draw, and the recently elected party leader, Margaret Thatcher, delivered her famous “swamping” comments on nationwide television in January 1978; in that interview she offered sympathy for the indigenous white population forced to interact with the immigrants, implying the implementation of additional controls under a Conservative majority.

Fourth, Labour’s electoral margin was razor thin. The February 1974 elections produced a minority Labour government, and the October elections provided Labour with a slim majority of three, the same narrow margin that, I argued earlier, caused

73. Craig 1990, 192, 197–98.
Labour to cave into anti-immigrant interests concentrated in a small number of constituencies. By April 1976, by-election losses and defections deprived the government of its majority. All of these factors suggest that constituency pressures would be sufficient to convince Labour to introduce additional immigration controls. Their lack of legislation, I argue, was due to a parliamentary pact with the Liberal party. This pact enabled the Labour government to remain in power for almost the full length of the five-year electoral term, but, because of the Liberal’s pro-immigrant stance, the alliance prevented Labour from introducing immigration control legislation.

The Liberals’ “liberal” credentials on immigration control were well established in 1974. They fought beside Labour against the original 1962 act, and they maintained their position in 1968 against the Labour majority and again in 1971 against the Conservative majority. The immigration control “consensus” shared by Labour and Conservatives excluded the Liberal party. David Steel, elected party leader in 1976, not only led the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary campaign against the 1968 act, he also continued his campaign in print, including a 1969 book on Commonwealth immigration and control in Britain. Both the February 1974 and the 1979 Liberal general election manifestos promised to repeal those clauses of the 1971 act that negated obligations to citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies and “to abolish the discrimination against non-patrials which creates second-class citizens.”

Liberals were free from anti-immigrant constituency pressure to a large extent because their electoral constituencies were predominantly rural and contained few, if any, immigrants. Because the structural conditions in parliamentary constituencies are correlated with and provide a reasonable representation of anti-immigrant sentiment (see prior section), these figures are presented. Table 3 lists majority Liberal constituencies in any one of the 1974 and 1979 elections and the percentage of foreign-born individuals in both the 1966 and 1981 censuses. In the post–World War II heyday of Liberal electoral success, when the Liberals garnered 20 percent of the national vote, the single-member constituency electoral system permitted only fourteen electoral victories at a maximum, most in swing constituencies. All the liberal constituencies, with one exception (Rochdale), reflect low levels of immigrants. Because we rely on census data for the constituency level characteristics, we do not have indicators of unemployment levels for this period. If earlier and later levels of unemployment are indicative of average levels of unemployment, however, at least half of the constituencies could be considered pro-immigrant, and only one Liberal

76. Craig 1990, 207-208, 310.
77. As argued in the prior section, these structural indicators provided a rule of thumb to politicians in evaluating constituency demands. Individual-level data provide support that these indicators were correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment in the 1960s; for this period, appropriate polls, merged with census data, are unavailable. Appropriate polls must include questions on attitudes toward immigration as well as the political salience of immigration issues. Moreover, the polls must include a residence locator by political constituency. Therefore, I rely on the correspondence between structural conditions and public opinion established in the prior section.
constituency (Rochdale, and only in 1981) might meet the criteria associated with anti-immigrant pressures. As the Labour majority dwindled during the course of the electoral term, the Conservative party tabled a no-confidence vote in March 1977. The Labour prime minister, Callaghan, negotiated a “Lib-Lab Pact” to defeat the vote of no confidence, a pact established for six months and ultimately renewed for a total of eighteen months, in the middle of the term, from March 1977 to September 1978. The Liberals were to be consulted in advance on all major policy initiatives, providing an informal veto over legislation. It followed that not only was Labour unable to introduce its own legislation on British citizenship, but “in April 1978 an all Party Parliamentary Select committee called for stricter controls on entry as well as internal controls and a quota for the Indian subcontinent, but this was disowned by the Home secretary.”

### TABLE 3. Liberal constituencies, 1974 (February and October) and 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>New Commonwealth immigrants (%)</th>
<th>New Commonwealth immigrants and &quot;aliens&quot; (%)</th>
<th>Anti-immigrant sentiment</th>
<th>Swing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isle of Ely—Cambridgeshire</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truro</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochdale</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berwick, Northumberland</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Isle of Wight</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colne Valley</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardigan—Ceredigion</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverness</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orkey and Zetland</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxburgh—Tweeddele</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazel Grove</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodmin—Cornwall</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall North</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon North</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool, Edgehill</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National average (mean)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Anti-immigrant sentiment is measured by: (percentage of New Commonwealth immigrants + aliens) × (unemployment).*

*NA = not applicable.*

As the Labour majority dwindled during the course of the electoral term, the Conservative party tabled a no-confidence vote in March 1977. The Labour prime minister, Callaghan, negotiated a “Lib-Lab Pact” to defeat the vote of no confidence, a pact established for six months and ultimately renewed for a total of eighteen months, in the middle of the term, from March 1977 to September 1978. The Liberals were to be consulted in advance on all major policy initiatives, providing an informal veto over legislation. It followed that not only was Labour unable to introduce its own legislation on British citizenship, but “in April 1978 an all Party Parliamentary Select committee called for stricter controls on entry as well as internal controls and a quota for the Indian subcontinent, but this was disowned by the Home secretary.”

Another plausible explanation for Labour’s about-face on immigration control focuses on Labour’s efforts to cater to the immigrant or black population. However, public opinion polls suggest that the black population was only slightly more open to immigration than the indigenous population and that less than 10 percent of the population of any race favored greater immigration levels. Table 4 illustrates that in 1983 majorities of both native and immigrant respondents wanted fewer Asian and West Indian immigrants, and the same majorities favored the current level of Australian and European immigration, perhaps corresponding to the empirical patterns of higher immigration rates for Asians and West Indians. In fact, in two of the four cases, attitudes toward immigration were not statistically different. It seems unlikely, then, that Labour was responding to black constituency pressures.

I have discovered no statements by Liberal and Labour ministers to the effect that Liberals prevented Labour from introducing immigration control legislation. Nonetheless, the “liberal” impact of the Lib-Lab parliamentary pact is consistent with the absence of Labour immigration control legislation in this period, whereas alternative explanations are unsatisfactory.


### TABLE 4. Public opinion on immigration, 1983a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response to immigrant group</th>
<th>Less (%)</th>
<th>Same (%)</th>
<th>More (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indians and Pakistanisb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native respondents (N = 1550)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant respondents (N = 74)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Indiansd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native respondents (N = 1523)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant respondents (N = 71)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australians and New Zealandersd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native respondents (N = 1549)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant respondents (N = 73)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from EC Countriesd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native respondents (N = 1542)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant respondents (N = 73)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 1983.

a Responses to the question “Britain controls the number of people from abroad that are allowed to settle in this country. Please say, for each of the groups below, whether you think Britain should allow more settlement, less settlement, or about the same amount as now.”

b $\chi^2 = 25.2812; p = 0.00$

c $\chi^2 = 24.0065; p = 0.00$

d $\chi^2 = 3.6892; p = 0.16$

e $\chi^2 = 3.4861; p = 0.18$
Maintenance of the immigration control status quo did not preclude continued Labour support for immigrant integration. Labour introduced three Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968, and 1976) outlawing racial discrimination in various arenas and providing penalties for discriminatory behavior. Moreover, they attempted to apply immigration controls more equitably, as when they modified immigration regulations in 1974 to grant women residents the same rights of family reunification as those available to men. Equitable treatment was a concern of immigrant voters and may explain why those voters tended to support the Labour party regardless of Labour’s position on immigration control. However, these measures were not and should not be understood as efforts to expand British immigration.

Conservative Return to Immigration Control—The British Nationality Act of 1981

The constraints binding Labour did not apply to the Conservative party. Conservative leader and later prime minister Thatcher, in particular, actively employed the immigration issue to defuse the electoral threat of the National Front and to attract National Front voters, as well as to claim the loyalties of prior Labour voters. Immigration control was a consistent theme in Conservative party general election manifests since they first introduced control legislation in 1961. The 1979 manifesto included a detailed and draconian eight-point program that limited entry of parents and adult children of settled migrants, revoked equal treatment of partners of women citizens and settled migrants, and proposed a register of Commonwealth dependents entitled to entry under the 1971 Immigration Act.

For the Conservative party, the structural conditions producing anti-immigrant sentiment had only continued to grow over the intervening period. This is primarily due to the rapid rise in unemployment and the growing concentration of immigrant communities rather than to an overall increase in immigrants. A comparison of 1966 and 1981 census data is instructive. The average NCW immigrant population per constituency rose from 1.7 to 2.8 percent, whereas the average “alien” immigrant population rose from 1.7 to 1.8 percent and the Irish immigrant population actually dropped from 1.9 to 1.1 percent. So the total average foreign-born population actually rose only 0.4 percent, from 5.3 to 5.7 percent of the resident population. However, that population tended to become more concentrated, as indicated by higher maximums in all categories, except the Irish; the maximum NCW population per constituency actually doubled, from 15.8 percent to 30 percent. The unemployment rate skyrocketed from 1.2 percent in 1966 to 11.8 percent in 1981. From the constitu-

80. A minor exception to the Conservatives’ rather uniform immigration control policy is the admission of twenty-seven thousand Asians expelled from Uganda in 1972. These immigrants may be understood best in terms of refugee admissions which, until the refugee and asylum crisis in Europe, were governed by different political processes. See Footnote 1 regarding exclusion of refugees and asylum seekers from the scope of the study.
ency perspective, the unemployment rate varied enormously, with a 4.1 percent minimum and a 36 percent maximum.

Because the structural conditions in parliamentary constituencies are correlated with and provide a reasonable representation of anti-immigrant sentiment (see prior sections and Footnotes 59 and 77), these figures are presented. Given the close temporal relationship between the 1981 census and the introduction of the British Nationality Act in January 1981, calculating anti-immigrant constituencies by focusing on the interaction between the level of immigrants and the rate of unemployment is feasible. Three measures of anti-immigrant constituencies were calculated, based on NCW immigration and unemployment (anti-immigrant 1), NCW and “alien” immigration and unemployment (anti-immigrant 2), and total foreign born and unemployment (anti-immigrant 3). All three scores are highly correlated. The anti-immigrant scores based on NCW and “alien” immigration range from 5 to 693 with a mean of 56 and a median of 25, indicating the same skewed pattern of distribution as the immigrant population. The top one hundred anti-immigrant constituencies had scores of more than 85, or three times the median score; the top fifty anti-immigrant constituencies had scores of more than 170, or six times the median score. Thirty-four anti-immigrant constituencies were also swing constituencies.

The anti-immigrant score is a quite different measure of anti-immigrant sentiment than either the presence of an immigrant population alone or unemployment alone. Unemployment and immigrant concentration are not highly related. As Table 5 illustrates, a slight negative correlation existed between unemployment and the various measures of immigrant concentration in 1966; the relationship changes to a slightly positive one by 1981. Anti-immigrant sentiment rises and falls with the unemployment rate but is only moderately related to the unemployment rate. However, anti-immigrant sentiment tends to be concentrated in those areas of NCW immigration ($r = .89–.92$, depending on measure) and in areas where NCW immigration is compounded by alien and Irish immigration ($r = .83–.91$, depending on measure). Thus, on an individual level, it is not surprising that neither unemployment nor the presence of an immigrant community generates anti-immigrant sentiments, whereas the combination of the two can explain that phenomenon.

Given the electoral competition between the Labour and Conservative parties, and the Conservative national margin in the 1979 election of twenty-two constituencies, it is unsurprising to find that the Conservative party quickly moved to implement its promised immigration controls through both the immigration rule changes in December 1979 and the British Nationality Act of 1981.82

To summarize, the theoretical framework provides a systematic analysis of when and why British immigration control policy changed. The analysis focuses on the underlying structural conditions that modify the level of support for and opposition to immigration and the translation of local political concerns to the national political agenda.

TABLE 5. Relationships among location of foreign-born, unemployment, and “anti-immigrant” constituencies

**Correlation matrix, 1966**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NCW</th>
<th>Aliens</th>
<th>Irish</th>
<th>For1</th>
<th>For2</th>
<th>Unemp</th>
<th>Anti1</th>
<th>Anti2</th>
<th>Anti3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NCW (1)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliens (2)</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish (3)</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign1 (1+2)</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign2 (1+2+3)</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant1a</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant2a</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant3a</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation matrix, 1981**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NCW</th>
<th>Aliens</th>
<th>Irish</th>
<th>For1</th>
<th>For2</th>
<th>Unemp</th>
<th>Anti1</th>
<th>Anti2</th>
<th>Anti3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NCW (1)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliens (2)</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish (3)</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign1 (1+2)</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign2 (1+2+3)</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant1a</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant2a</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant3a</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*a Anti-immigrant measures are created by multiplying three measures of immigrant concentration—NCW, Foreign1, and Foreign2—by the unemployment rate.

**Comparison with Country-Specific Analyses**

I have presented a general theoretical framework to analyze the politics of immigration control policy in advanced market economy countries. Additionally, I have analyzed three periods of immigration control policy in Britain and presented evidence that was consonant with the general analytical framework. Much of my evidence is drawn from and consistent with the large and excellent literature on the politics of immigration and race in Britain. Moreover, in presenting a general theoretical framework, I do not claim to explain all of the variation in British immigration control policy. Nonetheless, because I draw heavily on the British case, it is useful to evaluate the general framework in relation to the British literature. Here, I compare my explanation with contending theories.
The major controversy in the literature on British immigration control lies in the source of that policy: one group of analysts attributes the implementation of controls to public pressure, and the second group focuses on the role of elites. Both suffer from the same flaw: the lack of variance in the independent variable.

The first group of analysts points to societal pressures generated by the growing presence of immigrants and, in particular, "coloured" immigrants from NCW countries. My theoretical framework fits within this broad intellectual tradition but avoids the pitfalls of relying solely on public opinion. This is crucial because public opinion in Britain, as measured through public opinion polls, has remained relatively constant and negative toward immigrants. For example, in the Butler and Stokes polls conducted between 1964 and 1970, 81–87 percent of the respondents felt that too many immigrants had been let into Britain. These figures correspond with public opinion in the 1983 British Social Attitudes Survey where fewer than 10 percent of the respondents wanted more immigrants. The framework presented in this article accounts for the variation in immigration policy through the changing political salience of attitudes that arises both from structural conditions and from the political incentives created by electoral competition.

The second group of analysts points to the political elite as the source of immigration control policy—an elite that manipulates both policy and public opinion to achieve particular personal or political ends. Thus these analysts are able to explain the empirical disjuncture between public opinion and policy outcomes. However, absent a theory of changing elite preferences, they, too, are unable to explain variation in immigration policy. The framework I present explains the disjuncture between public opinion and policy outcomes through a set of electoral incentives that permit politicians to ignore societal demands under certain circumstances but force them to incorporate societal preferences in others. The framework thus resolves the puzzle by specifying the set of political constraints within which politicians must work in order to retain power. Thus the framework does not discard elite preferences, but it does suggest that if they run counter to electoral incentives, the politicians will either respond to the electoral incentives or lose office. Thus the framework provides a way of reconciling disparate observations of both schools of thought. It specifies the conditions under which societal preferences, both pro- and anti-immigrant, are translated into policy outcomes. However, my framework may not shed light on all the controversy surrounding the politics of immigration control in Britain.

Part of the remaining puzzle deals with the role of racism. Whether taking the societal or the elite approach, much of the literature on British immigration policy adopts the thesis of the broader immigration literature, that immigration controls are introduced in defense of national identity, in this case, a national identity based largely

84. See Butler and King 1965; Freeman 1979; Singham 1965; and Studlar 1978, 1980.
85. Assessing public attitudes exactly is difficult because the wording of survey questions varies over time.
on a common “white” ethnicity.\textsuperscript{87} The legislation discussed here was racist in the sense that it obstructed “coloured” immigration from Commonwealth countries. It was also, and I would argue primarily, anti-immigrant. The epithet “black Irish!” hurled at NCW immigrants as early as 1956 captures the dual nature of the issue. NCW immigrants were resented because of their color but also because of a growing immigrant presence. This was because “coloured” rather than “white” immigration was expanding and because it was more concentrated than the “white” immigration. The 1961 parliamentary debates on the Commonwealth Immigration Act describe similar opposition to white immigration in an earlier era but one well remembered by the debate participants. Gordon Walker (Smethwick), a leader of the opposition debate, recalled “that in Oxford all the things that are now said about immigrants were said about the Welsh.” James MacColl (Labour, Widnes) remembered an era in Paddington, “where we had all the problems of migration, the problems of the Irish and of the Welsh coming into areas and creating the same kind of difficulties that we have today.”\textsuperscript{88} These quotes suggest that color is only one of the attributes of immigrants and may not be the most prominent source of resentment. As Zig Layton-Henry notes, “the response to alien and colonial immigrants has been remarkably similar.”\textsuperscript{89}

Furthermore, most “white” immigration was more strictly controlled than Commonwealth immigration. For example, aliens were already subordinated to work vouchers and quotas under the 1953 Aliens Order of the 1919 Aliens Immigration Act. The 1962 act modified policies of Commonwealth immigration—which was completely uncontrolled—to match more closely those of other aliens. The only relaxation of immigration legislation was for European Community (EC) citizens after British accession in 1973. The lack of controversy over this relaxation of immigration controls can be attributed to the small potential flow of EC immigrants given Britain’s status as one of the poorer EC member states. Clearly race and immigration are intertwined, and racism is a problem in most, if not all, societies. However, it would be useful to untangle the relationship between racism and immigration rather than to obscure the relationship by treating the two concepts as identical.

To summarize, the theoretical framework provides a systematic analysis of \textit{when} and \textit{why} British immigration control policy changed without denying the racial component of immigration control in Britain. The analysis focuses on the underlying structural conditions that modify the level of support for and opposition to immigration and the translation of local political concerns to the national political agenda. I confess to emphasizing the variables significant to my framework and ignoring other factors that appear to play some role in immigration policy. This was done in an effort to develop a comparative framework that explains a large portion of the variance

\textsuperscript{87} See Macdonald and Blake 1991; Layton-Henry 1992, 1994. For an opposing argument, where problems are attributed to immigration and not color, see Patterson 1963.

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Hansard Parliamentary Debates}, vol. 649 (1961), cols. 715, 772.

\textsuperscript{89} Layton-Henry 1992, 8.
Within and across countries, to then embroider on this framework with factors unique to the specific country undoubtedly provides a more complete picture.

Conclusions

In this article I have presented a framework for analyzing the politics of immigration control in advanced market economy countries. I have argued that the geographic concentration of immigrants distributes the costs and benefits of immigration unevenly among the indigenous population. Local political pressures generated by these costs and benefits are then catapulted to the national political agenda when these constituencies are crucial to creating or maintaining a national political coalition. The evidence from Britain is consistent with the framework and elucidates some of the controversy surrounding the analysis of immigration policy in that nation-state. The early control over immigration, relative to some advanced industrial countries, is attributed to the presence of a small anti-immigrant constituency that was politically significant to the parliamentary majority. That is, the British may be no more, nor less, racist than the Belgians, Germans, or Australians. It is the dynamics of political competition, funneled through British political institutions, that catapulted immigration controls onto the national agenda much earlier there.

Because the disaggregated data necessary to the analysis are available only through periodic censuses, it is impossible to create a longitudinal data set to trace the rise and fall of anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant constituencies. Nonetheless, the three cases do provide a means of evaluating the role of local constituency interests in national electoral fortunes. The cases provide variation on the dependent variable, openness and closure, and they demonstrate a systematic concern with maintaining a national parliamentary majority. The cases underline the point that both pro- and anti-immigrant forces may be important to that national coalition. Attention to local constituency preferences and their significance to national electoral politics is not an exclusive explanation of immigration policy; however, I argue that it is an element that systematically underpins the politics of immigration control, whereas other factors may wax and wane. The framework thus provides a generic model that is potentially applicable to all advanced industrial countries.

The British case serves as a systematic comparative illustration to support the claim that the disaggregated analysis proposed in this article is a fruitful line of inquiry. However, data from a single country may introduce bias into the analysis. There are at least two possible sources of bias. First, although there is variation on the dependent variable within Britain, there is no variation on the dependent variable among countries. Britain represents only one data point in the cross-national compari-

90. An additional problem is the absence of census data by electoral constituency prior to 1966.
91. See Jackman 1985; and Smelser 1976.
son, although it is well within the norm for European nations (see Table 1). Therefore, claiming that the variables discussed here account for cross-national variation is premature. Second, even if these same processes are at work in all countries, different scale effects may exist among countries. It is difficult to discern, for example, whether Britain is a nation where these types of electoral calculations have larger (or smaller) effects than in other nations. However, after having established the plausibility of the hypotheses, the best method of overcoming any selection bias is to expand the research cross-nationally.

Advanced industrial countries exhibit substantial variation in the level of openness to immigration, yet the theories reviewed in the first section of the article cannot easily account for this variation in terms of national-level characteristics: concepts of national identity or economic pressures. Moreover, theories that combine these two elements, such as immigrant–native competition, employ aggregate national statistics that inaccurately translate the degree of interaction between the two populations generated by the geographic concentration of immigrant communities. A single paired comparison serves to illustrate the point. (West) Germany and Japan, for example, are countries with similar postwar economic and political histories. Both were defeated in war and adopted postwar constitutions influenced by the liberal democratic traditions of the victors. Both retained ethnically based concepts of national identity, reflected in *jus sanguinis* rules governing citizenship, where citizenship is bestowed by parentage rather than by location of birth. Both went on to achieve economic “miracles”: sustained high rates of economic growth combined with low unemployment. Nevertheless, in response to tight labor markets in both countries, Germany opted to import large numbers of “guest” workers to fill its factories, whereas Japan chose to retain a homogeneous labor force (in contrast to an earlier period during which labor was imported from other countries in the region, predominantly Korea).

If national traits cannot explain these disparities, disaggregating the analysis and examining local demands in support of and in opposition to immigration may reveal substantial differences in net demand for immigration in these countries. Japanese reticence may have been based on nominal employer demand for immigrant labor due to flexible labor markets and relatively high capital mobility rather than anti-immigrant sentiment. German employers, on the other hand, appear to have faced more inflexible labor markets and relative capital immobility that generated stronger demand for immigrant labor. Anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany may have been avoided in part, at least through the early 1970s, by both low unemployment and low contact between the immigrants and the native population through worksite housing and limited family reunification. Or, given similar net demand, variance may be attributable to the significance of pro- or anti-immigrant constituencies to national electoral majorities. This brief overview is no substitute for an in-depth analysis of immigration policy in these two nations as well as in other advanced industrial countries. Ultimately, however, in the absence of national traits to explain the vastly different types of immigration control policies, attention to subnational factors may provide the key to understanding a policy arena that remains obscure.
References


